

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD

INTEL CORP., DELL INC., and DELL TECHNOLOGIES INC.,

Petitioners,

v.

GENERAL VIDEO, LLC,

Patent Owner.

Case No. IPR2025-01037

Patent No. 9,843,786

PATENT OWNER'S PRELIMINARY RESPONSE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION1

II. SUMMARY OF THE 786 PATENT3

III. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION4

IV. NO REVIEW SHOULD BE INSTITUTED WITH RESPECT TO
THE GROUND RAISED BY PETITIONERS5

 A. Claims 1-8 and 12 Are Not Unpatentable5

 1. Suzuki.....6

 2. The Petition's Arguments Lack Merit9

 B. Claims 13-16 Are Not Unpatentable.....16

 C. Claim 17 Is Not Unpatentable20

 D. Claim 19 Is Not Unpatentable20

 E. Claim 21 Is Not Unpatentable21

V. CONCLUSION.....21

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

CustomPlay, LLC v. ClearPlay, Inc.
IPR2013-00484, Paper 29 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 5, 2014)..... 5

Delphix Corp. v. Actifio, LLC
IPR2015-01678, Paper 8 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 10, 2016)..... 15

Hyundai Motor Company v. Blitzsafe Texas, LLC
IPR2016-01476, Paper 12 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 24, 2017) 11

Initiative for Medicines, Access & Knowledge v. Gilead Pharmasset LLC
IPR2018-00390, Paper 7 (P.T.A.B. Jul 29, 2018) 11

Kinetic Techs., Inc. v. Skyworks Solutions, Inc.
IPR2014-00529, Paper 8 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 23, 2014)..... 11

Roxane Labs., Inc. v. Novartis AG
IPR2016-01461, Paper 9 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 13, 2017)..... 11

RPX Corp. v. Parity Networks, LLC
IPR2018-00097, Paper 7 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 24, 2018) 16

TQ Delta, LLC v. CISCO Sys.
942 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2019) 15

Statutes

35 U.S.C. § 103 (a)..... 5

Regulations

37 C.F.R. § 42.104 12

I. INTRODUCTION

Patent Owner General Video, LLC submits this preliminary response to the Petition filed by Petitioners requesting *inter partes* review of claims 1-8, 12-17, 19, and 21 (the “Challenged Claims”) of U.S. Pat. No. 9,843,786 (the “786 Patent”).

The Board must deny institution because the Petition fails to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that the Challenged Claims of the 786 Patent are unpatentable.¹ The sole ground in the Petition is based on obviousness, and the obviousness arguments are clearly based on hindsight. Each of the asserted prior art references differs significantly from the inventions claimed by the 786 Patent, claim limitations are missing from each of the asserted prior art references, and Petitioners fail to show the Challenged Claims would have been obvious over the asserted prior art references. Indeed, the primary reference the Petition relies on, Suzuki, was before the Examiner during examination of the 786 Patent, and the Examiner found the claims of the 786 Patent allowable over Suzuki. *See* Ex. 1002 at 24-27.

In particular, with respect to several limitations of the claims, the Petition’s arguments are not based on what the prior art references actually disclose. Instead,

¹ Patent Owner previously filed a Request for Discretionary Denial (Paper No. 7) that includes several reasons why the Board should, for discretionary reasons, deny institution, but it did not go into detail on the merits of the Petition.

the Petition points to teachings of the prior art that are not the same as what is recited in the limitations of the Challenged Claims, and then, relying solely on conclusory, *ipse dixit* expert testimony, fills the gaps in the teachings by asserting that a POSITA would have somehow *understood* those teachings to be the same as the language in the limitations and/or that it would have been obvious to a POSITA to combine those teachings to arrive at the limitation. Indeed, the constant refrain of “a POSITA would have understood/recognized” (supported solely by verbatim and conclusory *ipse dixit* expert testimony) throughout the Petition is the glue that tries, but fails, to hold Petitioners’ evidence-deficient arguments together for numerous limitations of the Challenged Claims.

In that regard, with respect to the sole ground, Ground 1, the Petition has failed to show that the combination of Tu, Suzuki, and Lida teaches or suggests at least the following limitations of independent Challenged Claims 1, 13, 17, 19, and 21:

- “wherein the signaling information comprises information with respect to a multiplexing scheme used in a second mode *for enabling the second audio-visual device to determine a decoding scheme to be used to decode a stereoscopic image format being used in the second mode*” (claims 1, 13, 17, 19, and 21); and
- “a processor arranged to extract image data, the processor being operable in . . . a first mode in which the processor extracts pixel image data for a 2D image from a stream of first data elements” (claim 13).

Because Challenged Claims 2-8 and 12 depend from Challenged Claim 1 and Challenged Claims 14-16 depend from Challenged Claim 13, the Petition fails to show that the combination of Tu, Suzuki, and Lida teaches or suggests all the limitations of those dependent claims.

Accordingly, Petitioners have not carried their burden of showing that any of the Challenged Claims are likely unpatentable.

II. SUMMARY OF THE 786 PATENT

The 786 Patent describes a novel solution that improves how stereoscopic image, or 3D image, data is delivered over a digital display interface. In particular, the 786 Patent describes a digital display interface part for use in a first audio-visual device for supporting a digital display interface between the first audio-visual device and a second audio-visual device. Ex. 1001 at 2:20-23. The interface part includes an input for receiving image data and a formatter arranged to format the data for transport over the interface. *Id.* at 2:25-27. The formatter is operable in a first mode in which the formatter generates a stream of first data elements which carry pixel data of a 2D image and a second mode in which the formatter generates a stream of second data elements which carry a multiplexed combination of components of a stereoscopic image. *Id.* at 2:28-33. The second data elements have a capacity which is no greater than the first data elements. *Id.* at 2:50-52.

As the 786 Patent explains, an advantage of this arrangement is that the stereoscopic image data can be carried across a digital display interface using the existing capacity of the interface. *Id.* at 2:34-36. Where the display interface supports various color depths of image data, the higher capacity transport modes which are intended to transport higher color depth data can be re-used to carry the multiplexed stereoscopic image data. *Id.* at 2:36-41. Therefore, no additional capacity is required from the interface to carry the stereoscopic data, and good color depth for the stereoscopic content is still allowed for. *Id.* at 2:41-43. The arrangement also requires little or no change to an existing standard defining the display interface and allows stereoscopic image content to be sent with a resolution which is significantly higher than schemes which sacrifice part of the active image area to carry the stereo image data. *Id.* at 2:43-49. Further, because the second data elements have a capacity which is no greater than the first data elements, stereoscopic data can be carried with minimal modification to the standards that define the interface. *Id.* at 2:50-54.

III. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION

For purposes of determining whether to institute based on the Petition only, Patent Owner does not construe any claim terms of the 786 Patent, but Patent Owner does not waive its right to propose new or additional constructions in litigation involving the 786 Patent, or later in this proceeding if the Board should decide to institute a trial.

IV. NO REVIEW SHOULD BE INSTITUTED WITH RESPECT TO THE GROUND RAISED BY PETITIONERS

As explained in detail below, the Petition fails to establish a reasonable likelihood that the Challenged Claims are unpatentable. The Petition proposes one ground against the 786 Patent:

- **Ground 1.** Unpatentability of claims 1-8, 12-17, 19, and 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over U.S. Patent Pub. No. 2008/0134237 (“Tu”), U.S. Patent Pub. No. 2007/0296859 (“Suzuki”), and U.S. Patent Pub. No. 2008/0187028 (“Lida”).

As discussed in more detail below, the cited references do not, individually or collectively, disclose, teach, or suggest all of the elements of the Challenged Claims. Where none of the references discloses an element of the claims, *inter partes* review for obviousness cannot be instituted. *See CustomPlay, LLC v. ClearPlay, Inc.*, IPR2013-00484, Paper 29 at 12-13 (P.T.A.B. 2014) (claims not unpatentable where none of the asserted prior art references disclosed a claim element).

For the foregoing reasons and as further discussed below, the Petition does not establish a reasonable likelihood that the Challenged Claims are unpatentable, and the Board should therefore not institute an *inter partes* review.

A. Claims 1-8 and 12 Are Not Unpatentable

The Petition does not show that there is a reasonable likelihood that the Petitioners would prevail on Ground 1 with respect to claims 1-8 and 12. In particular, the Petition has not shown that the combination of Tu, Suzuki, and Lida


teaches, or renders obvious, at least the following limitation of those claims: “wherein the signaling information comprises information with respect to a multiplexing scheme used in a second mode *for enabling the second audio-visual device to determine a decoding scheme to be used to decode a stereoscopic image format being used in the second mode.*”

1. Suzuki

The Petition relies primarily on Suzuki – which, again, was before the Examiner – to teach this limitation. Suzuki’s source device, *e.g.*, a DVD player, can send a display device, *e.g.*, a television, 2D image data in either an 8-bit pixel color format (as shown in Figure 1) or in a 16-bit pixel color format (as shown in Figure 2) or 3D image data in an 8-bit left eye data and 8-bit right eye data format (as shown in Figure 6). *See* Ex. 1006 at [0007], [0019], [0054], [0055], [0057]. With reference to Figure 11 of Suzuki below, the display device receives VSDB data from the source device that includes the pixels of 2D image data or the pixels of 3D image data. *See id.* at [0065]. At step S12, the display device determines what kind of video data it received from the source device, *i.e.*, 2D image data (having the format shown in Figure 1 or Figure 2) or 3D image data (having the format shown in Figure 6), and then at step S13 it asks if that received data is 3D image data or not. *See id.* at [0057], [0065].

If the received image data is 3D data in the format of Figure 6, then at step S14 it is detected whether or not the video display mode of the display device is a three-dimensional mode. *See id.* at [0065], [0067]. If the display device is in the three-dimensional display mode, then the display device demultiplexes the image data in the format of Figure 6 (8 bits of left eye data and then 8 bits of right eye data, *etc.*) and processes and displays the data as 3D video. *See id.* at [0058], [0065], Figure 11. Conversely, if the display device is not in a three-dimensional mode, *i.e.*, is in a 2D display mode, the display device selects only the first half of the 3D image data in each pixel (*e.g.*, data for the left eye) and ignores the other half of the data and transmits the selected data for display as 2D video. *See id.* at [0067], Figure 11. Suzuki states that the display device's ability to select and display half of the 3D image data as 2D data when not in the 3D display mode "is convenient for the user." *Id.* at [0069].

FIG. 11



Accordingly, the demultiplexing process performed by Suzuki's display device is fixed and depends solely on whether the display device is in the 3D display mode or not. The display device's demultiplexing process is entirely independent of the VSDB data received from the source device. Therefore, the determination of the scheme to be used by Suzuki's display device to decode a stereoscopic image format being used in the second mode is *not* enabled by signaling information from the source device that comprises information with respect to a multiplexing scheme.

2. The Petition's Arguments Lack Merit

The Petition fails to show otherwise with respect to Suzuki. The Petition asserts:

As discussed at [1.6.1], the signaling information (*e.g.*, VSDB data) comprises “configuration of the video data,” which indicates that 48 bits per pixel are being used to carry multiplexed left eye and right eye image data in stereoscopic 3D mode. *See* Ex.1006, [0065]. In such an instance, both the left eye and right eye image data utilize standard 24-bit color format. *See* Ex.1006, [0037], [0068], FIG. 6; Ex.1001, 7:65-67. Because the transmitted left eye and right eye image data have a standard 24-bit color format, the resulting stereoscopic 3D image presented on the display device will likewise have a standard 24-bit color format. Accordingly, **a POSITA would have understood** that this information enables the display device to determine a color format being used in stereoscopic 3D mode. Ex.1003, ¶¶234-235.

Pet. at 66-67 (emphasis added).

First, as discussed above, Suzuki's display device does not rely on or use the VSDB data from the source device to determine a decoding scheme to be used to decode the received 3D image format. Instead, the display device has two fixed ways of demultiplexing received 3D image data as formatted in Figure 6 – one for when the display device is in the 3D display mode, and one for when it is in the 2D display mode. The Suzuki display device's method for demultiplexing in the 3D display mode is always configured to decode image data according to the Figure 6 format,

so the display device does not need to, and does not, determine from the VSDB data a color format or multiplexing scheme being used in its stereoscopic 3D mode to determine a decoding scheme (*e.g.*, demultiplexing scheme) – it already knows the format and how to demultiplex the stereoscopic image components when the display device is in the 3D display mode. *See* Ex. 1006 at [0065]. Contrary to Petitioners' assertion, there is no disclosure, teaching, or suggestion in Suzuki that 3D image data will ever include anything other than 24-bit color (*i.e.*, 8 bits per color per pixel per eye). And when the display device is receiving 3D image data but operating in the 2D display mode, the display device's method of demultiplexing involves selecting only the first half of the data (*i.e.*, only the bits corresponding to the left eye data of each pixel). *See id.* at [0067]. Again, the determination of which of these two decoding schemes will be used for received 3D image data is determined exclusively by the operating mode of the display device and independent of received VSDB data. The method the display device uses depends solely on whether the display device is in the 2D display mode or in the 3D display mode when it receives the 3D image data.

Further, the Petition's argument relies heavily on the statement that "a POSITA would have understood that this information enables the display device to determine a color format being used in stereoscopic 3D mode." Pet. at 67. However, that conclusory statement is not supported by any disclosure, teaching, or suggestion

in Suzuki but is, instead, supported solely by verbatim, *ipse dixit* expert testimony and thus is entitled to no weight. *See* Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 234-235; *Kinetic Techs., Inc. v. Skyworks Solutions, Inc.*, IPR2014-00529, Paper 8 at 15 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 23, 2014) (“Merely repeating an argument from the Petition in the declaration of a proposed expert does not give that argument enhanced probative value.”); *Roxane Labs., Inc. v. Novartis AG*, IPR2016-01461, Paper 9 at 10 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 13, 2017) (“[C]onclusory expert testimony is entitled to little or no weight. . . . Where, as here, the conclusory testimony is the sole basis for establishing that a claim limitation is taught or suggested by the prior art, we find it insufficient to establish a reasonable likelihood of prevailing regarding that claim.”); *Initiative for Medicines, Access & Knowledge v. Gilead Pharmasset LLC*, IPR2018-00390, Paper 7 at 14-15 (P.T.A.B. Jul 29, 2018) (denying institution where, “by way of evidentiary support, the Petition directs us only to opinion testimony of [its expert], which merely repeats verbatim the conclusory statements set forth in the Petition, without providing any factual analysis or citing any supporting objective proof....[this] inadequately supported opinion on the question of obviousness ‘is entitled to little or no weight’”); *Hyundai Motor Company v. Blitzsafe Texas, LLC*, IPR2016-01476, Paper 12 at 21 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 24, 2017) (denying institution where the expert’s “representations are particularly unconvincing and of minimal probative weight given that they merely repeat verbatim the precise statements in the Petition”); *see also* 37 C.F.R. §

42.104(b)(4); Director's July 31, 2025 Memorandum regarding "Enforcement and Non-Waiver of 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(B)(4) and Permissible Uses of General Knowledge in Inter Partes Reviews" at 1 ("expert testimony, common sense, and other evidence that is not 'prior art consisting of patents or printed publications' . . . may not be used to supply a missing claim limitation").

The Petition further asserts that "Suzuki in the context of Figure 11 . . . discloses that the display device, which receives the signaling information (*e.g.*, VSDB data), uses the information at step S12 to determine video data configuration so that it can decode the received data by separating left and right eye video (step S15) and render it as a stereoscopic 3D display (step S16)." Pet. at 67. But Suzuki, says *nothing* about the display device using VSDB data in any way to determine how to decode received 3D image data by separating left and right eye video. Again, how the 3D image data is decoded is determined by Suzuki's display device at step S14 based exclusively on the mode in which the display device is operating and independent of any aspect of the VSDB data. The Petition fabricates that additional step (*i.e.*, determining how to decode 3D image data based on VSDB data) and adds it to Suzuki's disclosure, with the only support for doing so being verbatim, conclusory, *ipse dixit* expert testimony, which carries no evidentiary weight. *See* Ex. 1003 at ¶ 236.

Indeed, at step S12, the display device of Suzuki merely detects the configuration of the video data from the VSDB data. If 3D image data is received, at step S14, which does not consider VSDB data, “it is detected whether a present video display mode of the television receiver 30 is a three-dimensional mode,” and, subsequently, at step S15, “in the case where it is determined that the three-dimensional mode has been set, the video data for the left eye and the video data for the right eye are separated (or combined).” *See* Ex. 1006 at [0065], Fig. 11. Thus, Suzuki teaches that, when the display device receives 3D image data in the form of Figure 6, **and** it determines it is in the 3D mode, it uses a fixed scheme to decode the Figure 6 image data (*i.e.*, 8 bits of left eye data, 8 bits of right eye data, *etc.*). There is simply no disclosure of Suzuki’s display device using information with respect to a multiplexing scheme used in a second mode received from the source device to determine a demultiplexing scheme to decode the 3D image data formatted as shown in Figure 6.

The Petition then goes on to assert that

In view of Suzuki’s disclosure, **a POSITA would have understood** that the signaling information (e.g., VSDB data) enables the display device, at step S12, to “determine video data configuration” (e.g., that 48 bits per pixel are used to carry multiplexed left and right eye data in a stereoscopic 3D mode). **It would have been obvious to a POSITA** for the determined video configuration to be used in the decoding step S15, such that the video data for the left eye and right eye

are separated from the incoming pixels, with the left and right eye images having a standard 24-bit color format. *See* Ex.1006, FIG. 6. **It would have been obvious to a POSITA** to apply Suzuki's teachings to Tu because it would enable the display device to decode the received stereoscopic 3D image and display the video to the user. Ex.1003, ¶237.

Pet. at 68-69 (emphasis added).

Here again, instead of relying on what Suzuki actually teaches, the Petition relies heavily on conclusory statements about what a POSITA allegedly would have understood or found obvious – and those statements themselves are supported solely by conclusory, verbatim expert *ipse dixit*s. *See* Ex. 1003 at ¶ 237. Furthermore, the conclusory statements conflict with Suzuki's teachings. As discussed above, it would not have been obvious to a POSITA to use VSDB data in the decoding performed at step S15 because Suzuki's display device already knows the single, fixed scheme necessary to decode 3D image data formatted in the way shown in Figure 6. To use that scheme, the display device needs only to determine if the display device itself is in 3D mode – if it is, then it already has all the information it needs to decode the 3D image data. Further, because Suzuki does not teach that the VSDB data is used by the display device to determine a decoding scheme to be used to decode a stereoscopic image format being used in the second mode, it certainly would not have been obvious to combine Suzuki with Tu to arrive at that limitation – especially given the fact Tu does not even disclose displaying 3D video.

It is readily apparent that Petitioners' argument that the limitation of "for enabling the second audio-visual device to determine a decoding scheme to be used to decode a stereoscopic image format being used in the second mode" would have been obvious is based solely on improper hindsight, and, accordingly, Petitioners have failed to show that the cited art teaches the limitation. Therefore, claim 1, and claims 2-8 and 12, which depend from claim 1, would not have been obvious over Tu, Suzuki, and Lida. *See TQ Delta, LLC v. CISCO Sys.*, 942 F.3d 1352, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ("[The expert's] *ipse dixit* declaration 'fail[s] to provide any meaningful explanation for why one of ordinary skill in the art would be motivated to combine these references *at the time of this invention.*' It also 'fails to explain why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined elements from specific references *in the way the claimed invention does.*' Without this support, Dr. Tellado's declaration ultimately fails 'to resist the temptation to read into the prior art the teachings of the invention in issue.'" (internal citations omitted); *Delphix Corp. v. Actifio, LLC*, IPR2015-01678, Paper 8 at 20 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 10, 2016) ("[T]here are multiple instances in which Petitioner has failed to show a teaching of a claim limitation in the prior art. Petitioner has attempted to fill those gaps with conclusory expert testimony that, itself, does not cite to evidentiary support. . . . [W]e are persuaded that Petitioner's proposed combination . . . is not driven by the teachings of those references but, rather, is built on impermissible hindsight."); *RPX*

Corp. v. Parity Networks, LLC, IPR2018-00097, Paper 7 at 11-12 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 24, 2018) (“Petitioner’s reliance on the conclusory testimony of its Declarant to prove the unpatentability of a claim limitation is not supported by S-Ma’s disclosure or by other evidence of record. We further note that . . . ‘[e]xpert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.’”).

B. Claims 13-16 Are Not Unpatentable

The Petition does not show that there is a reasonable likelihood that the Petitioners would prevail on Ground 1 with respect to claims 13-16.

First, the combination of Tu, Suzuki, and Lida does not teach or suggest, or render obvious, the limitation of “wherein the signaling information comprises information with respect to a multiplexing scheme used in a second mode *for enabling the second audio-visual device to determine a decoding scheme to be used to decode a stereoscopic image format being used in the second mode,*” as recited in independent claim 13.

For that limitation, the Petition says “*See* [1.6.2]. Ex.1003, ¶[347.” Pet. at 94. The Petition identifies limitation [1.6.2] as the claim 1 limitation of “for enabling the second audio-visual device to determine a decoding scheme to be used to decode a stereoscopic image format being used in the second mode.” Pet. at 105. Accordingly, for the same reasons discussed above with respect to limitation [1.6.2]

of claim 1, the Petition has failed to show that the claim 13 limitation of “for enabling the second audio-visual device to determine a decoding scheme to be used to decode a stereoscopic image format being used in the second mode” is taught by or obvious over the combination of Tu, Suzuki, and Lida. Therefore, independent claim 13, and claims 14-16, which depend from claim 13, would not have been obvious over Tu, Suzuki, and Lida.

Second, the combination of Tu, Suzuki, and Lida does not teach or suggest, or render obvious, the limitation of “a processor arranged to extract said image data . . . being operable in: a first mode in which the processor extracts pixel image data for a 2D image from a stream of first data elements,” as recited in claim 13.

The Petition asserts that “the HDMI transmission processing unit 40 in the Tu-Suzuki combination with Suzuki (the ‘processor’) receives a stream of pixels compris[ing] B, G, R pixel data of a typical 2D image (*‘pixel data of a 2D image’*). Ex.1006, [0007], FIG. 1.” Pet. at 91-92. The Petition also states that “Suzuki further discloses that demultiplexer circuit 44 separates (*‘extracts’*) decoded data, both ‘in the case where the . . . video data is the video data for three-dimensional display’ (a *‘second mode’*) and for ‘a mode not displaying three-dimensional images (typical display mode)’ (the *‘first mode’*).” *Id.* at 92.

Thus, the Petition relies on Figure 1 of Suzuki – which shows pixels of 2D image data – to teach the claimed “stream of first data elements” from which pixel

image data for a 2D image can be extracted. Further, the Petition asserts Suzuki alone or in combination with Tu teaches a processor that operates in a “first mode” because Suzuki has a multiplexer circuit 44 that separates decoded video data in “a mode not displaying three-dimensional images.” However, when in the mode of not displaying three-dimensional images (what the Petition calls the “first mode”), Suzuki’s display device does not extract pixel image data for a 2D image from the pixels of 2D image data shown in Figures 1 and 2 (which the Petition relies on to teach a stream of first data elements). Instead, when in the mode of not displaying three-dimensional images, Suzuki’s display device retrieves just the first half of each pixel from a stream of 3D image data. *See* Ex. 1006 at [0045], [0067], and Figure 11 (at S14, S19).

In particular, and with reference to Figure 11 of Suzuki, at step S13, the display device asks if the received data is 3D image data or not. If the received image data is 3D data, then at step S14 it is detected whether or not the display device is in a three-dimensional display mode. *See id.* at [0065], [0067]. If the display device is not in a three-dimensional display mode (what the Petition calls the “first mode”), it selects only the first half of data (*e.g.*, data for the left eye) and transmits the selected data for processing and display as 2D video. *See id.* at [0067]. But, if the display device is in the three-dimensional display mode (what the Petition calls the “second

mode,” *see* Pet. at 92), then the video data for the left eye and right eye are processed and displayed as 3D video. *See* Ex. 1006 at [0065].

Thus, to recap, if, as the Petition asserts, the pixels of 2D image data in Figure 1 of Suzuki are the claimed “stream of first data elements,” and the non-three dimensional display mode of Suzuki’s display device disclosed in paragraphs [0045] and [0067] and Figure 11 is the claimed “first mode,” Suzuki does not teach or suggest a processor that, in the first mode, extracts pixel image data for a 2D image from a stream of first data elements. Instead, Suzuki teaches that the display device extracts half the pixel data from a stream of 3D image data (such as that shown in Figure 6) – and not from the stream of 2D image data shown in Figure 1 – when it is in the first mode.

As the Petition does not point to any teachings in Tu or Lida that cure Suzuki’s deficiencies, the Petition fails to show that the references teach, suggest, or render obvious the limitation of “a processor arranged to extract said image data . . . being operable in: a first mode in which the processor extracts pixel image data for a 2D image from a stream of first data elements.” Accordingly, for this additional reason, the Petition fails to show that claims 13-16 would have been obvious over the Ground 1 art.

C. Claim 17 Is Not Unpatentable

The Petition states that independent “[c]laim 17 is substantially similar to claim 1,” and that “[t]he analysis at [1.0.3], [1.1], and [1.4.1]-[17.6.2]² corresponds to limitations [17.0.3], [17.1], and [17.3.1]-[17.6.2], respectively.” Pet. at 96. Accordingly, and using the Petition’s limitation identifiers, for the same reasons discussed above with respect to limitation [1.6.2] of claim 1 (“for enabling the second audio-visual device to determine a decoding scheme to be used to decode a stereoscopic image format being used in the second mode”), the Petition has failed to show that the combination of Tu, Suzuki, and Lida teaches or renders obvious limitation [17.6.2] of claim 17 (“for enabling the second audio-visual device to determine a decoding scheme to be used to decode a stereoscopic image format being used in the second mode”). *See* Pet. at 105, 109.

D. Claim 19 Is Not Unpatentable

The Petition states that independent “[c]laim 19 is substantially similar to claims 1 and 17” and that “[f]or limitations [19.0.3], [19.1] and [19.3.1]-[19.6.2] see analysis at [1.0.3], [1.1] and [1.4.1]-[1.7.2], respectively.” Pet. at 98. Accordingly, and using the Petition’s limitation identifiers, for the same reasons discussed above with respect to limitation [1.6.2] of claim 1 (“for enabling the second audio-visual device to determine a decoding scheme to be used to decode a stereoscopic image

²This appears to be a typo and should read “[1.4.1]-[1.6.2].”

format being used in the second mode”), the Petition has failed to show that the combination of Tu, Suzuki, and Lida teaches or renders obvious limitation [19.6.2] of claim 19 (“for enabling the second audio-visual device to determine a decoding scheme to be used to decode a stereoscopic image format being used in the second mode”). *See* Pet. at 105, 111.

E. Claim 21 Is Not Unpatentable

The Petition states that independent “[c]laim 21 is substantially similar to claims 1 and 17,” and that “[f]or limitations [21.0.3], [21.1], [21.3.1], [21.4.1]-[21.6.2] see analysis at [1.0.3], [1.1], [1.4.1], [1.5.1]-[1.7.2], respectively.” Pet. at 99-100. Accordingly, and using the Petition’s limitation identifiers, for the same reasons discussed above with respect to limitation [1.6.2] of claim 1 (“for enabling the second audio-visual device to determine a decoding scheme to be used to decode a stereoscopic image format being used in the second mode”), the Petition has failed to show that the combination of Tu, Suzuki, and Lida teaches or renders obvious limitation [21.6.2] of claim 21 (“for enabling the second audio-visual device to determine a decoding scheme to be used to decode a stereoscopic image format being used in the second mode”). *See* Pet. at 105, 112.

V. CONCLUSION

For at least the foregoing reasons, Patent Owner respectfully requests that the Board refuse to institute an *inter partes* review.

Dated: September 23, 2025

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that the Patent Owner's Preliminary Response in connection with *Inter Partes Review* Case IPR2025-01037 was served on September 23, 2025 by electronic mail to:

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CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT

Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.24(d), the undersigned attorney for the Patent Owner declares that this Patent Owner Preliminary Response has a total of 5,065 words, according to Microsoft Word® word count tool, excluding the parts of the Response exempted by 37 C.F.R. § 42.24(a)(1).

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