

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD

CARBYNE, INC.,
Petitioner,

v.

TRITECH SOFTWARE SYSTEMS,
Patent Owner.

Case No. IPR2025-00959
U.S. Patent No. RE50,016

**PATENT OWNER'S REQUEST FOR DISCRETIONARY DENIAL OF
INSTITUTION**

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Exhibit No.	Description
Ex. 2001	<i>CentralSquare Technologies LLC v. Carbyne, Inc</i> , Case No. 1:24-cv-01497, Complaint for Patent Infringement (W.D. Tex. Dec. 4, 2024)
Ex. 2002	<i>CentralSquare Technologies LLC v. Carbyne, Inc</i> , Case No. 1:24-cv-01497, Ex. A to Complaint (W.D. Tex. Dec. 4, 2024)
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Ex. 2005	<i>CentralSquare Technologies LLC v. Carbyne, Inc</i> , Case No. 1:24-cv-01497, Proposed Scheduling Order (W.D. Tex. July 7, 2025)

I. INTRODUCTION

The Acting Director should exercise her discretion to deny institution because the Petition (Pet.) challenges U.S. Patent No. RE50,016 (“the ’016 patent”) based on prior art that is either identical to, or at best, cumulative of, the prior art that the Examiner evaluated during prosecution of the ’016 patent. The *Fintiv* factors and settled expectations also favor discretionary denial.

While the ’016 patent issued in 2024, Petitioner had notice of this patent’s family since at least 2021. At that time, Patent Owner sent Petitioner a notice letter identifying Petitioner’s infringement of U.S. Patent No. 9,301,117 (“the ’117 patent”) that issued in 2016. Ex. 2002. Rather than challenge the ’117 patent at the Patent Office, Petitioner sent a letter several months later asserting that the ’117 patent was invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over the reference the Examiner applied during original prosecution—U.S. Patent Publication No. 2010/0261492 to Salafia et al.—and a new reference—U.S. Patent Publication No. 2012/0190384 to Marr et al. Ex. 2001, ¶16; Ex. 2003. This 2025 IPR petition repackages those same arguments Petitioner presented in 2022.

After this exchange, a reissue application of the ’117 patent was filed that (1) provided the examiner with the newly identified Marr reference, and (2) added several new dependent claims. Indeed, the IDS specifically called out the Marr application. The Examiner considered the references (Ex. 1002, 109, 114), applied

Salafia in a non-final office action (Ex. 1002, 122-133), and ultimately allowed the claims because:

[t]he prior art of record fail to anticipate or render obvious the limitation as cited in combination with other features in claims 1 and 9 where “the first outgoing textual message includes a uniform resource locator (URL) link to the web resources”; “querying, through web resources, wireless mobile devices for location information; sharing, responsive to receipt of location information, received location information with the presentation module.”

Ex. 1002, 201.

This allowable subject matter is identical to the limitations recited in the ’117 patent—challenged claims 1, 5-9, and 13-16 are also substantively identical to claims 1, 5-9, and 13-16 of the ’117 patent. *Compare* Ex. 1001, 15:10-17:10 *with* Ex. 1002, 65-66. Patent Owner notified Petitioner of the reissue patent less than two weeks later. Ex. 2001, ¶17.

Petitioner now urges the Board to expend considerable resources to reevaluate patentability over Salafia and Marr and two cumulative references: Brooks and SARLOC. This is the exact scenario § 325(d) was intended to shield patent owners against. Not only that, but Petitioner has not offered any stipulation, so the same grounds will also be rehashed in district court. The Acting Director should deny institution accordingly.

II. DISCRETIONARY DENIAL IS APPROPRIATE UNDER § 325(d).

The Petition should be discretionarily denied under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) because it relies on prior art references that are either (1) identical to the ones evaluated and considered by the examiner during prosecution, or cumulative of these same references, and (2) Petitioner cannot demonstrate and has not alleged material error in the Examiner's findings. *Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH*, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential).

As explained in detail below, Grounds 1 and 2 each satisfy *Advanced Bionics* Step 1 because the references relied on in Ground 2 were previously evaluated during prosecution, and the references in Ground 1 are cumulative of the references evaluated during prosecution. Grounds 1 and 2 also satisfy *Advanced Bionics* Step 2 because Petitioner cannot demonstrate that the examiner's findings were unreasonable, or identify other material errors.

A. *Advanced Bionics* Step 1 Is Satisfied with Respect to Ground 2 Because Salafia and Marr Were Previously Considered and Evaluated by the Examiner.

In determining whether discretionary denial is warranted, the Board must first consider “whether the same or substantially the same prior art or argument previously was presented to the Office” (“Step 1”). *Advanced Bionics*, Paper 6 at 8-

10 (citing *Becton, Dickinson*¹ Factors² (a), (b), and (d) as relevant to the Step 1 analysis). Such is the case here, where Ground 2 relies on references that were expressly considered and evaluated during prosecution.

Ground 2 of the Petition asserts that the challenged claims are obvious over Salafia and Marr. Pet., 6. But Patent Owner submitted both of these references in a short IDS at the outset of the reissue process (Ex. 1002, 67) and the Examiner

¹ *Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. B. Braun Melsungen AG*, IPR2017-01586, Paper 8 (Dec. 15, 2017) (precedential as to § III.C.5, first paragraph).

² *Becton, Dickinson* identifies the following non-exclusive factors: (a) the similarities and material differences between the asserted art and the prior art involved during examination; (b) the cumulative nature of the asserted art and the prior art evaluated during examination; (c) the extent to which the asserted art was evaluated during examination, including whether the prior art was the basis for rejection; (d) the extent of the overlap between the arguments made during examination and the manner in which petitioner relies on the prior art; (e) whether petitioner has pointed out sufficiently how the examiner erred in its evaluation of the asserted prior art; and (f) the extent to which additional evidence and facts presented in the petition warrant reconsideration of the prior art or arguments. *Becton, Dickson*, Paper 8 at 17-18.

considered them shortly thereafter. Ex. 1001, code (64); Ex. 1002, 109, 114. Salafia was also substantially relied on by the Examiner in the Non-Final Rejection dated January 24, 2024. Ex. 1002, 122-133. In that rejection, the Examiner relied on Salafia as a primary reference to reject each of claims 1-27 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103, *including* the allowable subject matter. Ex. 1002, 122-133; *id.* at 126 (mapping Salafia to the allowable subject matter); *id.* at 202 (identifying allowable subject matter).

Following the rejection, the Examiner agreed with Patent Owner that Salafia did not disclose or render obvious various claim limitations, including the allowable subject matter. Ex. 1002, 143 (Applicant-Initiated Interview Summary). The Examiner then confirmed in the Notice of Allowance that neither Salafia,³ nor the other “art of record,” which included Marr, anticipated or rendered obvious the claims. Ex. 1002, 200-201. Accordingly, Step 1 of the *Advanced Bionics* framework is satisfied with respect to Ground 2 because the Examiner considered and substantively evaluated Marr and Salafia during prosecution. *See Stone Basket Innovations, LLC v. Cook Med. LLC*, 892 F.3d 1175, 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“when

³ Salafia was also independently evaluated by another examiner and found not to disclose or render obvious the ’117 patent. Ex. 1003, 193-194. This prosecution history was also evaluated during examination of the ’016 patent. Ex. 1002, 101.

prior art ‘is listed on the face’ of a patent, ‘the examiner is presumed to have considered it’”) (citing *Shire LLC v. Amneal Pharm., LLC*, 802 F.3d 1301, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2015); *Ecto World, LLC v. RAI Strategic Holdings, Inc.*, IPR2024-01280, Paper 13 at 5 (PTAB May 19, 2025) (precedential as to §A: 35 U.S.C. § 325(d)) (“Challenging the claims using the same prior art that was previously presented on an IDS is sufficient to satisfy the first part of the *Advanced Bionics* framework.”) (citing *Advanced Bionics*, Paper 6 at 7-8; *Google LLC v. Valtrus Innovations Ltd.*, IPR2022-01197, Paper 18 at 15 (PTAB June 13, 2023))).

B. *Advanced Bionics* Step 1 Is Satisfied with Respect To Ground 1 Because Brooks and SARLOC Are Cumulative of the Prior Art Evaluated During Examination.

In Ground 1, Petitioner relies on Brooks and SARLOC to render obvious a subset of the challenged claims. Pet., 6 (challenging only claims 1, 5-9, and 13-16). But these references are not materially different from the prior art evaluated during prosecution. Petitioner does not and cannot contend otherwise; therefore Ground 1 also satisfies *Advanced Bionic* Step 1.

For example, Brooks is cumulative of Salafia at least because Petitioner relies on Brooks to disclose the same limitations as Salafia in independent claims 1 and 9.

Compare Pet., 2:

Brooks teaches a system for managing communications during an emergency call. The system captures incoming voice calls. But rather than limiting the dispatcher to verbal communication, the system also

allows the dispatcher to transmit text messages to the caller. The texts can request information about the caller's emergency the GPS location of the caller ... Brooks does not mention that the texts its system sends to callers include URLs directing the caller to a website that collects this GPS location information ...

with Pet., 3:

Salafia teaches a system that receives emergency calls and then allows the call dispatcher / handler to communicate with the caller via text message.... Salafia fails to disclose the specific type of text required by the claims (text messages with URLs that direct caller phones to websites that collect GPS location information).

See also Pet., 22-32 (relying on Brooks for claim elements [1-p]⁴-[1-5] and [9-p]-[9-5]) and Pet., 40-51 (similarly relying on Salafia to disclose claim elements [1-p]-[1-5]) and [9-p]-[9-5].

Furthermore teaching reference SARLOC is cumulative of teaching reference Marr at least because Petitioner relies on SARLOC to render obvious the same limitations as Marr in independent claims 1 and 9. *Compare* Pet., 2 (“While Brooks does not mention that the texts its system sends to callers include URLs directing the caller to a website that collects this GPS location information, SARLOC does”) *with* Pet., 3 (“... Salafia fails to disclose the specific type of text required by the claims

⁴ For ease of reference, Patent Owner adopts Petitioner's numbering of the claim elements in this IPR proceeding.

(text messages with URLs that direct caller phones to websites that collect GPS location information) ... another prior art reference—Marr—unambiguously teaches the specific type of text the claims here require.”); *see also* Pet., 32-36 (relying on SARLOC to render obvious claim elements [1-6]-[1-8] and corresponding claim 9 elements) and Pet., 51-59 (similarly relying on Marr to render obvious claim elements [1-6]-[1-8]) and corresponding claim 9 elements).

SARLOC is also cumulative of other references evaluated by the Office, including Ray US 2010/0220840 (“Ray”) and Quan US 2010/0174560 (“Quan”). Ex 1002, 126-127 (relying on Ray and Quan to teach and render obvious various limitations relating to the presentation module identified in the allowable subject matter); Ex. 1002, 143 (Examiner suggesting that “Quan and other references might teach the limitation” corresponding to “web resources configured to query wireless mobile devices for location information.”); Ex. 1002, 200-201 (confirming no “art of record” anticipates or renders obvious the allowable subject matter).

Accordingly, *Advanced Bionics* Step 1 is also satisfied with respect to Ground 1 because each of Brooks and SARLOC are cumulative of the references previously evaluated by the Office.

C. *Advanced Bionics* Step 2 Is Satisfied with Respect to Grounds 1 and 2 Because Petitioner Does Not and Cannot Demonstrate That the Office Materially Erred in Allowing the Challenged Claims.

Petitioner bears the burden of showing that the Office erred in a material

manner by allowing the claims of the '016 patent during prosecution. *Advanced Bionics*, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 9 (“[i]f reasonable minds can disagree regarding the purported treatment of the art or arguments, it cannot be said that the Office erred in a manner material to patentability. At bottom, this framework reflects a commitment to defer to previous Office evaluations of the evidence of record unless material error is shown.”).

Regarding Salafia, Petitioner acknowledges that the Examiners in both the original prosecution and the reissue proceedings considered Salafia, and that both Examiners allowed the claims upon finding that Salafia did not teach the allowable subject matter. Pet., 11, 14. Petitioner then alleges that “Salafia *does* teach both (1) that the texts its system sends can include URLs and (2) that its system can obtain phone GPS location information.” Pet., 3. According to Petitioner, “[t]he Examiner did not appear to appreciate this.” Pet., 3. Petitioner is wrong.

As the Acting Director has explained, when “the Examiner applied the asserted prior art or substantially the same prior art during examination, then a petitioner must demonstrate that, for example, the previously presented art teaches the limitations of the challenged claims, and that *no reasonable examiner could have found otherwise.*” *Ecto World*, IPR2024-01280, Paper 13 at 6 (emphasis added). Here, the Examiner appreciated the full scope of Salafia’s disclosures, as evidenced by its thoughtful discussion of Salafia during prosecution. *See* Section II.A, above.

Furthermore, Petitioner relies on Salafia (and cumulative reference Brooks) in substantially the same way as the Office. Pet., 22-32, 40-51. Indeed, Petitioner effectively concedes that the Office correctly determined that Salafia does not disclose or render obvious the allowable subject matter, because it relies on Marr to render obvious claim elements [1-6] and [1-7], which correspond to the allowable subject matter. Pet., 53-57. Thus, it cannot be true that the Examiner materially erred in its analysis of Salafia or that it overlooked the cumulative variation Brooks.

Petitioner also cannot demonstrate material error with respect to Marr or cumulative reference SARLOC. As explained in Section II.A, Marr was previously considered and evaluated by the Office. That Marr was not applied in a rejection *per se* does not demonstrate that the Examiner overlooked its alleged teachings. To the contrary, the Examiner considered Marr then confirmed, following an interview and reconsideration of the prior art, that “[t]he prior art of record fail[s] to anticipate or render obvious” the allowable subject matter.” Ex. 1002, 201. Petitioner’s statement that “the Examiner did not mention Marr or appear to recognize that it teaches the subject matter referenced in the notice of allowance” (Pet., 12, 14) is insufficient to establish material error under Step 2 because “a petitioner must provide an analysis [under part two of *Advanced Bionics*] even when the asserted prior art is on an IDS, but the Examiner did not apply the reference.” *Ecto World*, IPR2024-01280, Paper 13 at 5; *see also Vital Connect, Inc. v. Bardy Diagnostics, Inc.*, IPR2023-00381,

Paper 7 at 19-20 (PTAB July 11, 2023) (“[P]etitioner is silent on material error, even though its relied-upon references (or their substantially identical disclosures), were before the Office during examination of the application leading to the [patent-at-issue].”). Furthermore, Petitioner relies on Marr and SARLOC to fill gaps in Salafia and Brooks that do not exist (as explained under *Fintiv* Factor 6 below). Such combinations do not establish obviousness, let alone material error.

Accordingly, and because Grounds 1 and 2 also fail to withstand scrutiny under *Advanced Bionics* Step 2, discretionary denial is warranted under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). Ground 3 is substantially similar to Ground 2, except it relies on previously evaluated reference Salafia to render obvious “structural detail.” Pet., 69-73. Because this combination does not alter that *Advanced Bionic* analysis above, Ground 3 should also be denied under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d).

III. THE *FINTIV* FACTORS FAVOR DISCRETIONARY DENIAL.

The *Fintiv* factors collectively favor discretionary denial because trial is scheduled for December 14, 2026—the same week as a projected final written decision in this proceeding—and the parties will have invested significant resources in the parallel proceeding prior to institution, including preparing for a *Markman* hearing scheduled to take place the same day as a projected institution decision in this proceeding. Ex. 2004, 2. Furthermore, Petitioner, who is defendant in the district court proceeding, has not proffered a stipulation to mitigate or eliminate concerns of

overlap between the proceedings.

Factor 2 (trial date proximity): Factor 2 strongly favors discretionary denial because trial is scheduled to occur the same week as a Final Written Decision. On July 8, Judge Albright issued an order scheduling jury selection and trial for December 14, 2026. Ex. 2004, 5. This is the same date jointly proposed by the parties. Ex. 2005, 5. A Notice of Filing Date Accorded issued in this proceeding on June 13, 2025 (Paper 4), making the projected institution decision date December 15 (December 13 being a Saturday) and the projected Final Written Decision date December 15, 2026—the week of trial. Ex. 2004, 5. The Board has long held that Factor 2 strongly favors discretionary denial when trial is scheduled on or about the same date as trial. *Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc.*, IPR2020-00019, Paper 15 at 13 (PTAB May 13, 2020) (“We generally take courts’ trial schedules at face value absent some strong evidence to the contrary. We have no reason to believe that the jointly agreed-upon trial date ... will be postponed ...”). There is no reason to deviate here, particularly where the district court will determine validity of the same claims at issue here. Accordingly, Factor 2 strongly favors discretionary denial.

Factor 3 (investment in parallel proceeding): Factor 3 favors discretionary denial because the parties will have made significant investments in the district court proceeding before issuing an institution is decision. As seen in the scheduling order, *Markman* hearing is scheduled on December 15, the same day as a projected

institution decision. Ex. 2004, 2. Thus, the parties will have made significant investments identifying claim terms for construction, preparing, and exchanging claim construction briefings, and preparing for the hearing. Ex. 2004, 1-2. These investments alone strongly favor discretionary denial. The parties will have also made significant investments preparing initial disclosures, which are due the day after the *Markman* hearing. Ex. 2004, 3. Accordingly, Factor 3 strongly favors discretionary denial.

Factor 4 (overlap of the issues): Factor 4 favors discretionary denial because there is substantial overlap between the challenged claims and the claims asserted in the district court, and Petitioner has not stipulated to mitigate or eliminate overlap between the proceedings. Petitioner could have and should have notified Patent Owner and the district court of any intent to stipulate to not pursue all or some of the grounds raised in the instant proceeding. While the Board typically does not speculate, in this case, it is evident that Petitioner does not intend to reduce the degree of overlap between the instant proceeding and parallel litigation. Such overlap favors discretionary denial. *See, e.g., Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc.*, IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 12 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (finding “concerns of inefficiency and the possibility of conflicting decisions [are] particularly strong” where there is substantial overlap); *Full-Metal-Power BV v. Infocus Downhole Sols. USA*, IPR2025-00391, Paper 14 at 2 (PTAB June 25, 2025) (Denying institution where

petitioner did not file a stipulation “despite overlap” and trial date was scheduled close to the projected final written decision). Accordingly, Factor 4 favors discretionary denial.

Factor 5 (identity of the parties): It is undisputed that Petitioner is defendant in the district court litigation. Thus, Factor 5 favors discretionary denial. *Fintiv*, IPR2020-00019, Paper 15 at 15.

Factor 6 (additional considerations): Factor 6 favors discretionary denial for various reasons.

First, as explained above in Section II.A, the Examiner reissued the challenged patent after evaluating the very references Petitioner (1) alleged were invalidating (Ex. 2001, 4, ¶¶16-17; Ex. 2003), and (2) now asserts in the Petition. Pet., 6. Petitioner could have sought reexam or IPR on the substantively identical claims of the ’117 patent, but chose not to. Petitioner should not be permitted to waste the Board’s resources to reevaluate the patentability of substantively identical claims over the same references and cumulative variants.

Second, Patent Owner has developed strong settled expectations. As the Director has routinely held since the onset of the bifurcated discretionary process, “[s]ettled expectations of the parties, such as the length of time the claims have been in force,” favors discretionary denial. *See Dabico Airport Sols. Inc. v. AXA Power ApS*, IPR2025-00408, Paper 21 at 2-3 (PTAB June 18, 2025) (refusing to “disturb

the settled expectations of Patent Owner” after patent was in force for 8 years); *NVIDIA Corp. v. Neural AI, LLC*, IPR2025-00608, Paper 16 at 2-3 (PTAB July 31, 2025) (finding strong settled expectations based on the age of patent, and where the parties “had a commercial relationship” whereby patent owner provided petitioner with original and reissue patent information, but “Petitioner[] fail[ed] to seek early review of the patents.”). Such is the case here. Not only did substantively identical claims of the ’016 patent first issue almost a decade ago as the ’117 patent (*see* Ex. 1001, code (64)), Petitioner is a direct competitor of Patent Owner and was aware of the ’117 patent at least as early as November 4, 2021. Ex. 2001, ¶¶10-15; Ex. 2002 (informing Petitioner of the original patent). Despite this, Petitioner waited until after Patent Owner expended considerable resources obtaining a reissue patent to challenge the substantively identical claims of the reissue patent.

Patent Owner’s settled expectation are further strengthened by its successful reissue patent, the challenged claims of which are not only substantively identical to ’117 patent claims 1, 5-9, and 3-16, but were found patentable over the very references (and cumulative variations thereof) that Petitioner asserts in the instant proceeding. *See* Section II above; Pet., 6. Accordingly, discretionary denial is further warranted under settled expectations.

Third, the merits of the petition are weak. As Patent Owner will explain in further detail in its preliminary response, Petitioner’s primary motivation for

combining previously evaluated and cumulative references must fail because it purports to fill a gap in the primary references that does not exist. In Ground 1, for example, Petitioner relies on SARLOC to fill alleged gaps in Brooks. Pet., 37-38 (“While Brooks’ system uses messaging to obtain a caller’s GPS location, Brooks does not detail exactly how this occurs.”). But there are no gaps to fill. In Brooks, first, the dispatcher texts the caller to see where they are. *See* Ex. 1005, ¶[0023]. If they receive information they rely on it. *See id.* If they do not, they use the mobile base station to locate the caller’s position. *See id.* They may also text the caller after triangulating their phone to determine a more precise location. *See id.* Similarly in Ground 2, Petitioner alleges Salafia does not “specifically explain how its system obtains GPS information from calling cell phones” so a POSITA would have been motivated to look to references like Marr to fill in the gap. Pet., 53-54. As with Ground 1, there is no gap to fill—Salafia explains that the call handler receives “textual information” including “location data forwarded to the PSAP 212 by the cellular network 222” and that the “location data may, for example, be based on cell tower 220 location and cell phone signal attributes or on GPS information obtained from the cell phone, the cellular services provider or some other source.” Ex. 1007, ¶[0061]. Salafia also explains that a “cell phone carrier may be able to obtain a more accurate location by triangulating the cell phone signal between multiple towers. Moreover, cell phones with GPS capabilities may be operable to provide accurate

location information.” Ex. 1007, ¶[0108]. Thus, Salafia already explains how the call handler obtains GPS information (automatically from the phone itself or via the cell phone carrier).

The other so-called motivations rely heavily on Petitioners’ contentions that the references purportedly relate to the same field or goal. However, the law is clear that simply being in the same field or endeavor or having the same goal do not by themselves establish a reason to combine references. *William Wesley Carnes, Sr., Inc. v. Seaboard Int’l Inc.*, IPR2019-00133, Paper 10 at 17-18 (PTAB May 8, 2019) (“statement[s] of similarity, however, do[] not constitute an articulated reasoning with rational underpinning as to why a POSITA would combine elements of one reference with another, and why a POSITA would modify the teachings of the references to arrive at the claimed invention”) (citing *KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.*, 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007)). These deficiencies are compounded by Petitioner’s reliance on conclusory expert testimony. *See Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc.*, IPR2022-00624, Paper 9 at 15-17 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2022) (precedential) (accorded “little weight” to declaration testimony that contains a verbatim restatement of a petition’s conclusory assertions without additional supporting evidence or reasoning); *Facebook, Inc. v. Windy City Innovations, LLC*, 973 F.3d 1321, 1340-41 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (affirming Board decision giving no weight to expert testimony that “merely repeat[ed] Petitioner’s argument, nearly verbatim, without citation to the

basis for his testimony”). Thus, the weaknesses of the Petition also counsel against institution.

IV. CONCLUSION

Patent Owner respectfully requests that the Acting Director exercise her discretion to deny institution based on at least the arguments and evidence set forth above.

Date: August 13, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

By: /Lionel M. Lavenue/
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

The undersigned hereby certifies that the foregoing Request for Discretionary Denial of Institution contains 4,059 words, excluding those portions identified in 37 C.F.R. § 42.24(a), as measured by the word-processing system used to prepare this paper.

By: /Lionel M. Lavenue/
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Reg. No. 46,859

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that a copy of this **Patent Owner's Request For Discretionary Denial of Institution and Exhibits 2001-2005** were served on August 13, 2025, via email directed to counsel of record for the Petitioner at the following:

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